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With the March 4th election rapidly approaching in Russia, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
Prime Minister, and presidential candidate, Vladimir Putin has backed himself into a corner from 
which it will be difficult to extricate himself.  Moreover, the possibility of using violence to 
crackdown on demonstrators, or to keep his regime in power, will likely grow over the next 
months, particularly after the election. 
The air of invulnerability which surrounded the Putin regime during most of its first decade in 
power has been replaced by uncertainty.  Putin may, indeed, remain in power after the election, 
but he will have to use means other than personal popularity and a growing economy to buttress 
his repressive regime.  Without these assets, it would seem that Putin is faced with several 
options: liberalize and allow the opposition to win something, do nothing and hope for the best, 
or crackdown more to ensure that the regime stays in place for the short term. 
A closer look at the situation faced by Putin, as well as by other leaders in similar situations, 
indicates that the only remaining card he can really play is to crackdown more.  Taking a harder 
line is, in some respects, a high risk strategy.  It has worked in some cases, most notably in China 
in 1989 where the bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown has helped the Chinese Communist 
Party to remain in power for more than two decades following the that incident.  However, in 
other countries, including the recent case of Libya, a harder line by an embattled authoritarian 
has only hastened his decline.  Russia is not yet in a comparable situation to Libya under 
Gaddafi, but the central lesson is still relevant. 
Putin will nonetheless be inclined to crackdown because the other options, while perhaps more 
appealing and more likely to lead to a peaceful outcome in which Putin might preserve some role 
for himself, are not as viable as they initially seem.  The reason for this is that while Russia is not 
close to being a democracy, it is also not run entirely by one man.  While Putin may have 
centralized a great deal of political power, there are others who have loyally supported him, and 
dramatically enriched themselves through business, corruption and exploiting their relationship 
with Putin.  These people have more to lose than Putin if there is a peaceful transition.  Many of 
them will face possible jail time, find that there are not many places to which they can flee, and 
may lose much of their wealth. 
If Putin moves towards taking a more moderate stand, it is this core of supporters, many of 
whom are very important to the regime, who will oppose it.  If his closest circle of supporters 
will not support any option than a crackdown, Putin will have very little choice but to pursue that 
policy.  Thus, Putin may find himself in the strange position of being the moderate in the ruling 
party.  He is the one who has to think, at least a little bit, about his legacy, and who will have the 
greatest likelihood of patching together a decent life if there is a smooth transition to a post-Putin 
Russia, but the people around him will have much fewer opportunities of that kind. Ultimately, 
Putin’s hands are tied not by his opponents, but by his closest supporters. 
2 
 
It is possible that Putin will find another way out of this situation.  He might create or exacerbate 
an external crisis to try to rebuild his support; the opposition could make several missteps or 
become hopelessly divided; or Putin might stand up to his supporters and do the right thing for 
himself and his country.  However, barring a radical shift in events or approach that would be 
needed for any of these outcomes, the next few months in Russia could become ugly, before they 
get better. 
